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Abstract
This paper is the written text underlying the keynote presentation at 
the Sunbelt XXXVIII in Utrecht, 2018. It presents a neo-structural 
approach to social processes in the organizational society and the 
usefulness of the analyses of multilevel networks to understand how 
we navigate these processes and are made aware of them when we 
face cooperation dilemmas. Empirical illustrations look at how multilevel 
networks and relational infrastructures are useful to research a process 
such as coopetitive learning in science, business and government. A 
con clusion focuses on the role of multilevel relational infrastructures in 
institutional entrepreneurship, social change and politics, as well as on 
our responsibility to develop our knowledge of these social processes 
and multilevel relational infrastructures as open science.
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Embarked on social processes in  
the organizational society
The main social processes in which sociology has been 
interested since the nineteenth century are solidarity 
and exclusion; deviance, control and conflict resolution; 
regulation and institutionalization; and learning and 
socialization. To say that these processes are social is to 
say that much of their deployment is always problematic 
and beyond our individual control. Even when we can 
influence one of their episodes or components, we are 
embarked in/by them, cannot stop them, and necessarily 
navigate their tumultuous course with others. Together, 
these processes can be considered to be social 
capital of the collective. Navigating our course in these 
processes with others makes everyone interdependent, 
and interdependencies are thus too important to be left 
unorganized. We are thus reminded of this navigation 
each time we meet cooperation dilemmas. To manage 
these dilemmas, individuals and societies try to organize 
these interdependencies with structure and culture; for 
example, with relational infrastructures reflecting vertical 
differentiations (forms of status), horizontal differentiations 
(forms of division of work) and norms of behavior and 
exchanges associated with position in the structure 
created by these differentiations. Structure, culture and 
agency as analytically distinct operate in conjunction 
with each other and drive each other’s evolution.
Among indicators of these interdependencies, 
we find impersonal interactions and personalized 
relationships. Today, the focus is on personalized 
relationships and relational infrastructures, especially 
multilevel relational infrastructures. We define rela-
tionships as channels for resources and moral 
commitments with the exchange partners. Specified 
by culture and agency, relationships combine into 
relational patterns and these patterns are the relational 
infrastructures shaping the social processes identified 
above. Relational infrastructures are the backbones 
of certain forms of organized collective action and 
production, which we call collegial (not to be confused 
with congenial). Since all the social processes 
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identified above have a relational dimension, studying 
them from the perspective of this relational dimension 
adds to their sociological understanding.
The study of the association between position 
in the social structure and behavior, as revisited by 
White et al. (1976) and developed in particular by 
INSNA members, has contributed to understanding 
this navigation. When personalized relationships are 
stabilized, they form relational infrastructures (for 
example, dimensions of status measured by centrality, 
or division of work approached with blockmodels) 
that both help members of the collective manage 
their cooperation dilemmas and constrain them. 
They represent complex opportunity and constraint 
structures (White, 1970) nested in social classes that, 
at some periods in history, facilitate mobilizations, 
accumulation and opportunity hoarding (Tilly, 1998).
This new structural analysis was bolstered during 
subsequent decades by specialized statistical models 
for networks as dependent variables. In these models 
exogenous effects, i.e. based for example on class, 
gender, ethnic affiliations, occupation, formal status, 
etc., bring into the picture the wider social context 
and its conflicts to understand and explain the 
formation of networks at different levels of granularity: 
dyadic (with p2 models, e.g., Van Duijn et al., 2004), 
triadic or higher order levels (with ERGMs, e.g., 
Pattison and Wasserman, 1999; Snijders et al., 2006; 
Wasserman and Robins, 2005), and thus of relational 
infrastructures. This rigorous methodology has helped 
to analyze and to contextualize the deployment of 
the social processes and their navigation. Further 
sophistication and stabilization of these analyses look 
at the co-evolution of these networks, behaviors, 
normative choices and positions (e.g. dynamics 
in Snijders’, 1996, 2005; Snijders and Steglich 
(forthcoming), analyses of longitudinal network data) 
where networks are both contexts and contextualized.
This neo-structuralism recognizes that the 
management of interdependencies and cooperation 
dilemmas have certainly always been sophisticated 
and complex. However, as shown by modern 
sociologists – from Weber (1978) to Presthus (1962), 
Coleman (1982), Perrow (1991), Lindenberg (1997), 
Wittek (2017), Wittek and Van de Bunt (2004), Wittek 
and Van Witteloostuijn (2013) – the organization of 
interdependencies is today further characterized by 
the fact that we now live in an “organizational society.” 
In this organizational society, the meso-level of social 
order (and therefore the construction of the macro 
level) is dominated by those who control organizations 
as “tools with a life of their own” (Selznick, 1949, 
1957) that tend to “absorb societal functions” (Perrow, 
1991). This perspective focuses the attention on the 
necessity to factor into the analyses – of relational 
interdependencies and infrastructures, social pro-
cesses and their navigation – much more than in 
the recent past, the fact that society is stratified by 
superposed levels of organized collective action. The 
study of structure, culture and agency has to take this 
vertical, multilevel dimension of social phenomena 
much more into account.
Understanding navigation of social 
processes with the analyses of  
multilevel networks
The concept of duality (Breiger, 1974; further 
developed by Fararo and Doreian, 1984 and many 
others), in which individuals and groups/organizations 
co-constitute each other, is central to understand this 
vertical and multilevel dimension of the organizational 
society. In particular, it can mean that position in 
the organizational society is built from at least two 
levels of collective agency: inter-individual and inter-
organizational. To revisit theories of tumultuous and 
often violent social processes and their collective 
navigation in the organizational society, we argue that 
it is useful to look at this navigation at least at two 
superposed levels of collective agency, simultaneously. 
A level is defined here as a system of collective agency 
with the same vertical and horizontal differentiations 
between members as those considered in the previous 
section (i.e. multiple dimensions of socio economic 
status and forms of division of work). Actors at each level 
can be the individuals (affiliated in the organizations) or 
organizations (companies, government administrations, 
professions, associations, cooperatives, etc., affiliating 
individuals). Individuals build relationships within and 
across organizational boundaries; and organizations 
build an inter-organizational field or system (industry, 
policy domain, etc.) in Selznick’s (1949) sense of 
“dynamic configuring fields”. At each level, we find 
all the generic social processes and the relational 
infrastructures that help navigate them. Each level can 
be represented as a network that is homogeneous 
with respect to type of actors, as in Figure 1, and these 
structures can be analyzed as made up of units of 
analysis that are pairs of person-organization, in which 
the person is affiliated in the organization.
In general terms, looking at the characteristics 
of such pairs helps to further understand position in 
the social structure, i.e. individuals dually positioned 
in superposed levels of collective agency. Duality 
as co-constitution of one level with the other can 
be further modelled here using what Snijders 
(2016) calls “analysis of multilevel networks” 
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(AMN), as differentiated from “multilevel network 
analysis” (MNA). In this approach, each level is 
context for the other and represents a form of 
collective agency (Wasserman and Iacobucci, 1991; 
Parcel et al., 1991; Lazega, 1994; Lazega et al., 2008; 
Lazega and Snijders, 2016). Such networks overlap 
and coevolve in complex ways, and these overlaps 
become indicators of meso-level context for individual 
relational strategies across boundaries, but also for 
the construction of macro-level structures (social 
stratification and inequalities). Each level is context 
for the other. Statistical models helping explore the 
emergence and determinants of such structures 
are provided, for example, by Snijders and Bosker 
(2012), Koskinen et al. (2017), Wang et al. (2013, 
2016), Žiberna (2014), Žiberna and Lazega (2016), 
Zappa and Lomi (2015), Tranmer et al. (2016). Today I 
would like to report some of our explorations of how 
these multilevel dynamics work, based on datasets 
following this linked design.
Economic sociology offers many example of such 
forms of coopetition (Brailly et al., 2018, provide an 
overview), understood as paradoxical cooperative 
competition. They show how these overlap and 
their management always matter in understanding 
markets, more generally contexts where coopetition 
is vital. In this domain, this multilevel perspective 
has provided a new network boundary specification 
technique, as illustrated and developed by Eloire 
(2010), Eloire et al. (2011), Penalva-Icher (2010), 
Oubenal (2015), Piña-Stranger and Lazega (2011), 
Brailly (2016), Favre et al. (2016), who all look at how 
competitors cooperating in markets navigate social 
processes with relational infrastructures. First, they 
list all organizations active in the field of study, and 
their interdependencies. Second, they list the main 
individuals who are affiliated in these organizations 
and know about the latters’ strategies, policies, 
interdependencies, exchanges, coordination efforts 
and capacity for resilience. This technique samples 
individuals, with all the limitations of samples, but is 
nevertheless useful as an exploratory technique when 
the researcher knows that the sample represents 
an organized community with inter-individual and 
inter-organizational collaborations. Third, they elicit 
interdependencies between these individuals active 
in the field with data on their activities, division of 
work, specialties, productivity and performance. 
This approach has identified overlooked positions 
and processes, for example the position of vertical 
linchpins (actors who are active at two levels, 
simultaneously), dual alters, extended opportunity 
structures, multilevel Matthew effects, etc.
If multilevel agency and strategies become 
so visible in the organizational society, it is preci-
sely because they help actors manage both inter-
dependencies and conflicts with each other, i.e. 
coopetition. If the organizational society generalizes 
coopetition, it is also likely to encourage a form of 
reflexivity that makes multilevel agency an explicit 
concern. Coopetition itself as an example of this 
general statement about social life, i.e. coorientation 
and coordination among actors who still jockey for 
positions and compete for resources, is as widespread 
as soccer games. However, in capitalist economies – 
where the lower the levels of social stratification, the 
Figure 1: Superposed levels of collective agency: inter-individual network, inter-organizational 
network, and affiliation network. In this multilevel, linked-design structure, the two levels are 
each made up of different types of units. In the analysis of multilevel networks (AMN), as 
understood here, the unit of analysis is the individual-organization pair.
(See ‘Catching up with the big fish in the big pond’,Social Networks, 2008, with Marie
Jourda, Lise Mounier & Rafael Stofer)
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more open, direct and systematic the competition 
forced upon their members – coopetition acquires 
a different meaning. In many coopetitive fields, for 
example, individual employees are put in charge 
of seeking, on a personal basis, information and 
advice from other employees belonging to different, 
competing companies, thus figuring out ways for 
their respective companies to coordinate with one 
another, i.e. to become relatively friendly competitors 
instead of engaging in cutthroat competition. Thus, 
a multilevel approach to collective action dynamics 
in the organizational and market society can identify 
ways in which companies compete in public, while 
their employees cooperate in private.
In theory, one should deal with such broad 
issues process by process, relational infrastructure 
by relational infrastructure, each dataset bringing 
its additional insights. Instead, I will focus here on 
one single process, coopetitive collective learning, 
in three different settings. This complexifies even 
further the tradition of studying learning through 
advice networks (see for example Agneessens and 
Wittek, 2012; Barbillon et al., 2016; Glückler et al., 
2017; Krackhardt, 1990; and many others). These 
case studies flesh out this multilevel perspective 
with the AMN: the first looks at multilevel 
coopetition in science; the second in business; the 
third in government. In these cases, we identify 
the multilevel relational infrastructures that help 
coopetitors navigate the focal social process that 
makes collective action among rival peers possible.
Examples: navigating coopetitive 
learning in science, business and 
government
The first example is a study of collective learning and 
coopetitive performance among public scientists, 
a population of top cancer researchers in France in 
1999−2000. This case in point focuses on collective 
learning among highly competitive actors. All are 
part of science as a multilevel production system 
with collective action at each level. Individuals are 
researchers, all “sublime” in different ways (eight papers 
per year in internationally visible journals scanned 
by Cancerlit – later merged into Pubmed – for three 
years in a row between 1996 and 1998). They work 
in different research laboratories. The two different 
levels of collective agency are, first, five different inter-
individual level advice networks supporting the work of 
these scientists; and second the inter-organizational 
level captured by seven networks of resource 
interdependencies between laboratories (recruitment 
of postdocs, shared expen sive technology, joint 
funding and research projects, etc.) supporting the 
collective projects of these respective organizations. 
The dominant specialty is still hematology-immunology 
that was able to associate more systematically with 
fundamental research since the 1970s. Indeed, more 
than a generation earlier, they had collectively won a 
race to learn and appropriate molecular biology, and 
to coopetitively share their experience of using its 
techniques1.
Multilevel position and relational  
infrastructures
Multilevel relational infrastructures, especially multi level 
status, mainly helped specific researchers navigate 
the coopetitive learning process. Here we roughly 
identify high and low multi-level status by taking the 
median in indegrees between individuals (i.e. central – 
the big fish) and less central (the little fish, below the 
median), and the same for organizations, combined 
with size (the big and the small ponds). We can thus 
identify four positions in multilevel status: the big fish 
in the big ponds (BFBP), the BFSP, the LFBP and the 
LFSP. On average performances of these categories 
differ. Impact factor (IF) scores are unreliable as 
measurement of quality of work, but it is nevertheless 
interesting in our exploratory approach to look at what 
story they tell. This story is that performances of the 
BFBP are higher, which is no scoop, but also that over 
time only the LFBP catch up with the BFBP2. This 
makes sense: only the large and central laboratories 
have enough resources to help their young postdocs 
and researchers remain in this highly competitive race.
This suggests that characteristics of organizations 
count more for IF performance than characteristics 
of individual members who navigate the coopetitive 
system. Size and centrality of their laboratory, as 
well as resources, seem to matter more than their 
own individual centrality in the advice networks in 
this segment of the profession. Thus, organizations 
influence and dominate the coopetitive learning 
process, especially in favor of the BFBP with high 
epistemic status, as well as the LFBP. Organizations 
are that important because they provide resources, 
1Retrospectively, we know that this social system was 
already in decline. Hematologists-immunologists specialized 
in leukemia still dominated this research field, but the 
invention of genetic sequencing, then its use by various 
applied specialties including epidemiological research, was 
going to extend medical knowledge on solid tumors.
2Napoleon used to say that in politics it is better to be first 
in one’s provincial village than second in Paris. In science, it 
seems to be the opposite.
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functional coordination, but also the social discipline 
needed to navigate the social processes at hand. One 
indicator of this social discipline was made available 
to us thanks to measurement of the perceptions by 
these researchers of who among the others were their 
direct competitors. Our analyses showed that, under 
specific conditions, researchers seek advice from, 
and share experience with, colleagues whom they 
recognize as direct competitors (Lazega et al., 2017). 
This was the case almost only among hematologists – 
immunologists and their laboratories. They were able, 
more than other specialties, for historical reasons, 
to turn cutthroat competition into more manageable 
coopetition, in particular by creating and sustaining 
this social discipline thanks to multilevel relational 
infrastructures mentioned above. Figure 2 is based 
on a stochastic blockmodel of two networks (advice 
and identification of direct competitors), i.e. a model 
based on probabilities of advice relations between 
and within blocks conditioned on presence of direct 
competitors. In this system, when factoring in the 
direct competition network jointly analyzed with the 
advice network among peers, only one social niche 
was identified as capable of this feat.
This single social niche in this system (Block 2 
central in Figure 2) brings together hamatologists-
immunologists. They were the only researchers 
whose relational infrastructure was helpful in terms 
of taming cutthroat competition and turning it into 
more or less friendly competition, thus facilitating 
the achievement of important results collectively and 
individually. This specialty was able to self-organize 
as a “social niche” (which is a relational infrastructure 
as defined above) over two generations, a block of 
scientist that not only brought together researchers 
with the same relational profile in this milieu, but 
also was capable of collective action as a cohesive 
group (Bernard et al., 2000). Inside the niche, social 
discipline was strong enough to stop competitors 
from sharing advice deliberately trying to mislead 
other members. In addition to resources, only this 
social niche of big ponds was able to provide this 
context and social discipline.
Cross-level agency, overlaps, strategies 
and resilience
But are organizations really thicker than individuals 
as determinants of such achievements? Our answer 
is yes if you measure their effect cross-sectionally, 
at least at one point in time. Only the LFBP with the 
right relational behavior learn to catch up with the 
BFBP over time as part of their heavily relational 
socialization (Lazega, 2014). Indeed variations 
among the LFBP (especially the young researchers 
looking for freedom and emancipation, as shown by 
Coromina Soler et al., 2011 and Ziherl et al., 2006) 
show that, in such multilevel systems, individual 
learning strategies matter too, not just their multilevel 
position. We measure these strategies by looking 
at the ways in which these scientists manage the 
overlaps between their own individual network and 
the network of their organization. We identified four 
types of overlaps as indicators of multilevel relational 
strategies: independent (no overlap, the researcher 
has relationships in the interindividual network that 
Figure 2: Seeking advice and learning 
from peers identified as direct 
competitors: managing coopetition 
with superposed social niches as a 
collective benefit of multilevel networks.  
Stochastic blockmodel based on the 
probabilities of advice relations between 
and within blocks conditioned on 
presence of direct competitors. The 
two kinds of links, seeking advice and 
identifying as a direct competitors, are 
dependent. In the second block there is 
a higher proportion of members seeking 
advice from each other and calling each 
other direct competitors than in the two 
other blocks. Node size proportional to 
block size, N = 126.
(See ‘Effects of competition on collective learning
in advice networks’, Social Networks, 2016, with
Avner Bar-Hen, Pierre Barbillon, Sophie Donnet)
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are members of laboratories in which his/her own 
laboratory does not have relationships at the inter-
organizational level); individualist and collectivist 
have more or less partial overlaps of different sizes; 
and the fusional strategy means that the researcher, 
being a good soldier of his/her lab, has relationships 
in the interindividual network only among members of 
labs in which his/her own lab has relationships at the 
inter-organizational level. It is interesting to note that 
the strategy that characterizes the “winners” in this 
system (the BFBP and the LFBP) is the individualist 
strategy. The radical independentist strategy, in 
particular, seems to be a mistake in this particular 
context – message for the younger colleagues in 
the audience. This analysis, as exploratory as it is, 
strongly suggests that things do not just happen for 
those in the right place at the right time: individuals in 
a coopetitive milieu are also strategic in their relational 
choices.
These individual strategies matter in the interplay 
between levels, but agency and strategy matter 
particularly over time. A multilevel approach shows in 
this case that the resilience of personal relationships, 
i.e. their deliberate maintenance over long periods, 
explains in part the effectiveness of these strategies, 
especially when organizations disappear. In our case 
in point, for many reasons, almost none of the 
laboratories in which we interviewed these resear-
chers and directors still exist today as organized 
entities: technology and methods have changed 
with genetic sequencing and genomics, turnover 
of members and directors have created new 
structures that have replaced to ones we observed. 
And nevertheless, the density of co-publication ties 
between members of this population of researchers 
is almost as strong 17 years later in 2016 as it was 
in 1999 (year of fieldwork). In this case in point, as 
shown by the comparison, in Figure 3, between 
the density of the co-publication networks among 
these scientists in 1999 and in 2016, the resilience 
of personal coworkers’ relationships is impressive. 
In total, 17 years after fieldwork, all laboratories had 
disappeared as organized entities, and researchers 
were in different laboratories. But they still published 
together, in part with the same colleagues as in 1999. 
To put it in a simplified way: combined collective 
learning and personal ties last long after organizations 
that brought these scientists together disappear.
This “long” term resilience of personal co-
publication ties, combined with strategies of invest-
ment in social discipline and relational infra structures, 
pay off. This observation limits very much the idea 
that organizational characteristics have more effect 
on performance than individual characteristics and 
agency in this context. The opportunity structure 
represented by organizations needs personalized ties 
within this milieu in order to become an important 
asset and determinant of performance. But one has 
to look at this effect over time to realize it.
Position and agency combined in  
extended opportunity structures:  
discreet kinds of inequalities
If both position and agency matter separately, how 
do they matter together as determinants of individual 
performance in this setting? Another way in which 
organizations matter, in addition to providing direct 
access to resources and a form of social discipline, 
is in their capacity and willingness to extend the 
opportunity structure of their members. This means 
rewarding (from the perspective of the director/
manager of the organization) their members who select 
the “right” multilevel relational strategies and align with 
the multilevel relational infrastructures. Which of the 
three strategies that maintain an overlap between the 
inter-individual and the inter-organizational networks 
is rewarded by which manager is an underexplored 
research question.
Indeed, one more reason why organizations are 
somewhat thicker than individuals when we look at 
determinants of this kind of performance is that they 
can extend members’ opportunity structures by 
providing access to what we call dual alters, especially 
dual alters with complementary resources. We have 
coined the added value for performance derived 
from indirect, multilevel, manager-enhanced access 
to resources accruing from an extended opportunity 
Figure 3: The “long” term resilience 
of inter-individual collaboration ties 
over 17 years, long after the different 
organizations in which they worked 
have disappeared.
(Bar-Hen & Lazega, forthcoming).   
1999 2016
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structure “network lift from dual alters” (Lazega et al., 
2013). We call dual alters actors in the system whom 
the focal actor does not reach on his/her own, but 
who can be introduced to the focal actor by his/her 
director/manager. As shown in Figure 4, network lift 
from dual alters is equivalent to closing a multilevel 
3-path. When directors/managers share relational 
capital to give access to dual alters, their members’ 
performance increases – especially when the dual 
alters are rich with resources complementary to that 
of the focal actor. When this occurs, the LFBP catch 
up with the BFBP.
Figure 5 visualizes the potential that dual 
alters represent. It shows all the dual alters with 
complementary resources accessible to researchers 
for coopetitive learning and collaborations through 
their inter-organizational ties. It is interesting to 
notice that 50% of the BFSP are both directors and 
researchers closing multilevel 3-paths for others, 
while their IF scores still decrease over time. One 
interpretation of this effect could be that their 
commitment to their laboratory as a whole comes 
with this individual cost since they no longer work for 
themselves but for the collective.
It is worth mentioning that this effect increases 
when we take into account an additional level, i.e. the 
personal collaboration team of the researcher and 
its characteristics (Lazega and Jourda, 2016). We 
then have the following different levels: the first level 
is the focal researcher’s personal collaboration team 
represented as an ego network (as in Burt’s (2005), 
Burt and Merluzzi (2014) “within group” entity); the 
second level is the complete advice network between 
Figure 4: How can inter-organizational 
ties be that important to members’ 
multilevel status? Dual alters induced 
relational capital accessed thanks to 
closing multilevel 3-paths. By providing 
an extended opportunity structures: 
“network lift” from “dual alters” and a 
3-level Matthew effect. They provide a 
social discipline across organizational 
boundaries, a discipline that makes 
it possible to seek advice from direct 
competitors (otherwise risky).
Director 1 Director 2 
Researcher i Dual alter k 
(See ‘Network lift from dual alters’, European Sociological Review,
2013, with Marie Jourda and Lise Mounier) 
Figure 5: A potential to realize through 
multilevel 3-paths: picture of all dual 
alters (in red) accessible to researchers 
(in green) for coopetitive learning and 
collaborations through their inter-
organizational ties (in blue). Green 
nodes are actors i. First circle of blue 
nodes are organizations in which actors 
i are affiliated. Second circle blue 
nodes are organizations with which 
first circle blue nodes are connected. 
Red nodes are dual alters accessible to 
members (green nodes i) through inter-
organizational networks. For the clarity 
of the picture, ties among members 
i (whether as focal actors or as dual 
alters) are not visualized.
(See ‘Network lift from dual alters’, European
Sociological Review, 2013, with Marie Jourda and
Lise Mounier) 
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all focal researchers in the field; and the third level 
is the inter-organizational network of laboratories 
in which these focal researchers are affiliated. The 
more dual alters with complementary resources one 
can reach and exchange with, and the denser the 
collaboration ego network, the higher the performance 
because the more likely the focal actor is to benefit 
from the equivalent of a 3-level Matthew effect. Indeed 
in multilevel systems, directors/managers can induce 
access to dual alters by closing such multilevel 3-paths. 
Thus network lift from dual alters is not only created 
by closing such complex paths. It is also derived from 
a specific kind of cumulative advantage. We pictured 
this 3-level Matthew effect with a paraglider with three 
levels (Lazega and Jourda, 2016). Incidentally, one 
of the questions one could ask in business schools 
is why managers do not create this connection with 
dual alters for their subordinates more often. The 
answer might be that this extension of opportunity 
structures of subordinates requires that managers do 
not perceive their relationship with their subordinates 
as cutthroat competitive.
The combination of specific multilevel relational 
strategies by individual members and the closing of 
multilevel 3-paths by the manager can transform a 
latent, extended opportunity structure, into a social 
process that is a collective asset shared and useful 
to navigate the coopetitive learning process. This 
special dimension of opportunity structures, which 
we call extended opportunity structures, thus matters 
for navigating social processes on multilevel, socio-
organizational networks.
Multilevel temporalities and  
synchronizations
Our second example is a study of collective learning 
and coopetitive survival in business3, in particular 
among sales representatives with precarious jobs 
in a trade fair for regional buyers and global sellers 
of television programs. Economists of culture show 
that this global industry is structured as an “oligopoly 
with fringes.” A small number of large multinational 
firms, the Majors, dominate the global market using 
scorched-earth tactics. They empty the pockets of 
the largest clients, for example by selling new and 
successful series, such as – at the time – “The Borgia,” 
while giving away for free, as an extra, enough hours of 
Mickey Mouse to fill the broadcasters’ grids for three 
hours per afternoon for an entire year. Such tactics 
undermine the official market where thousands of 
smaller producers with new and creative programs 
have to fight for leftover crumbs.
Looking at this market as a multilevel structure 
based on the linked design helps visualize it as in 
Figure 6. Brailly et al. (2016) and Favre et al. (2016) 
Figure 6: A trade fair as epistemic 
and economic space represented 
with multilevel networks of coopetitive 
learning among sales representatives 
for contracting companies. Result of 
successive visualizations by Julien 
Brailly, Saint-Clair Chabert-Liddell and 
David Schoch of a discussion network 
among sales representatives during 
year 1 (lower level) and the contract 
network signed the following year 
between the companies in which these 
sales representatives were affiliated 
(upper level). Many small companies, 
the units on the outer upper circle, 
did not sign any contract that year 
and thus find themselves isolated on 
this outer upper circle, as if they were 
watching the economic action driven 
by the more central companies doing 
business in the centre. The density 
of the lower level network represents 
the “buzz” network of this trade fair. 
For color codes and for a substantive 
explanation of this graph, see Brailly 
(2016; Brailly et al., 2016).
(See ‘Markets as Multilevel Networks’ (2015) with Julien Brailly,
Guillaume Favre and Josiane Chatellet)
3For a neo-structural economic sociology based on 
the relational work of entrepreneurs using coopetition 
to navigate social process in markets, see Lazega and 
Mounier (2003) and Brailly et al. (2018).
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show that it is worth network analyzing in detail how 
deals for the medium- and small-sized companies 
are initiated and designed by their respective sales 
representatives at the trade fair, then later trans-
formed into contracts by the companies at the 
inter-organizational level (Bathelt and Glückler, 2011; 
Berends et al., 2011). Fieldwork carried out in one 
such trade fair shows, for example, that the smaller 
players survive using multilevel, coopetitive strategies 
that are not entirely dissimilar to the strategies of the 
scientists cited above. Work at inter-individual level 
is based on personalized and cooperative advice 
networks (even between sales representatives 
working for competing companies), whereas work 
at inter-organizational level is based on competitive 
contracting networks. Brailly (2016) has shown how 
the Little Fish survive through coopetitive relational 
strategies at their inter-individual level. Survival from 
collective learning with coopetitors is based on 
sharing information at inter-individual level (this shows 
with triadic closure in ties among sellers) morphing 
into six-order multilevel, multisided, multiplex sub-
structures including individuals and organizations, on 
the buying and selling sides.
In this case of distribution of television programs, 
the networks reveal different structures and involve 
different mechanisms of tie formation. But this case 
also exposes a new dimension of agency in the 
survival strategies of the little fish, who think multilevel, 
mobilize multilevel status, and synchronize the different 
temporalities of the levels in their navigation of the 
process of coopetitive learning. This specific multilevel 
management of temporalities is thus another case in 
point of complementarity between levels. Synchronized 
schedules and time scales (Brailly, 2016) characterize 
the superposed temporalities of this multilevel system: 
A short term “See you next time this year” (at different 
trade fairs) temporality for individuals shows that the 
more individuals have recently participated in the same 
events, the more they exchange information with each 
other. Longer term “See you same time next year” (at 
this same trade fair) temporality for organizations shows 
that the more organizations participate in the long run 
in the same events, the more they deal with each 
other. In this multilevel structure, complementarity and 
synchronization are both necessary for performance, 
especially for the survival of smaller sellers (after 
oligopolistic predatory strategies undermined the 
market).
Thus, creating international socio-organizational 
ties in the context of a globalized markets requires 
a complex multilevel process that involves and 
synchronizes both companies and their employees. 
The structures of different levels strongly influence 
each other and are interdependent. Reframing the 
embeddedness paradigm with AMN seems to be 
a fruitful approach to understand the globalization 
of markets. Organizational and individual levels are 
both important in different, complementary and 
synchronized temporalities in this system. The long-
term deal network between companies influences 
cooperation ties between individuals, which in 
return can bring new business opportunities and 
constraints to their companies. These dynamics are 
likely to be recursive, combining short term and long 
term temporalities and processes (Quintane et al., 
2013). Also, although this sharing of leftover crumbs 
allows smaller players to survive, this is also the story 
of how big business produces a global cultural order. 
These coopetitive collective learning processes are 
at the core of the joint production of global cultural 
homogenization.
Multilevel agency in institutionalization 
processes
This multilevel approach to organized collective agency 
is equivalent to a form of contextualization of networks, 
behavior and social processes. It has also led back to 
a basic sociological insight predating network analyses. 
Just like micro, meso- and macro-levels of society, 
levels in the decomposition of networks (from dyads 
to morphology) cannot be linked purely mechanically. 
Levels of collective agency are linked by the strategic 
efforts of actors to structure the context of their actions 
and interactions at all levels, including at the macro 
level of society. Therefore we have argued that the 
contextualization of networks cannot be construed 
without a theory of politics. In fact identification and 
interpretation of multilevel relational infrastructures is 
intrinsic to politics. This can be shown, for example, 
with institutionalization processes, where actors as 
institutional entrepreneurs participate in normative 
controversies to structure the contexts of their 
interactions and thus to manage, for example, their 
cooperation dilemmas. What we call a neo-structural 
institutionalism explores how multilevel structure, culture 
and agency come together as different dimensions 
of these politics. This multilevel contextualization of 
networks and behavior has stressed overlooked 
structural dimensions in the structural study of politics, 
social change and innovation, for example by stressing 
the role of status inconsistencies, of collegial oligarchies, 
of the rhetoric of sacrifice in the management of losers, 
etc. (Lazega, 2001, 2018). More generally, in a Whitian 
spirit, further analyses can focus on organized mobility 
and relational turnover (OMRT) as determinants of the 
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social processes that can be modeled with multilevel 
social network analyses. Such phenomena also help 
contextualize social networks.
Therefore, our third example addresses this issue 
directly by studying collective learning and coopetition 
among institutional entrepreneurs. The latter are 
European judges participating in a form of elitist 
“social movement” lobbying to create a European 
transnational court to institutionalize a European-level 
intellectual property regime, especially for patents. 
These judges got involved in this political process 
of institution building because they saw it as their 
duty as citizens to participate in the construction of 
a new European-level legal regime for intellectual 
property, after politicians and governments tried and 
failed to do so. For other examples of such discreet 
regulators, especially in finance and the judiciary, 
(see Huault et al., 2012; Lazega and Mounier, 2012). 
Indeed, European governments had created a 
European patent in 1973, but had failed to create 
the transnational court that would enforce this legal 
instrument by relying on a common interpretation of 
this European patent. The judges thought that this 
failure weakened Europe’s capacity to innovate. It 
allowed large transnational companies and entire 
industries with patents at the core of their business 
model (such as the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industry, the semiconductors’ and digital industries, 
etc.) to instrumentalize the courts, engage in forum 
shopping (i.e. selecting the national courts and judges 
most favorable to their preferred outcome, case by 
case), and use long-lasting “zombie” patents.
Powerful organizations, such as a (non-EU) public/
private agency, the European Patent Office (EPO), 
supported this specialized and elitist social movement. 
This institution awards patents to business – but is 
also sole regulator of this system in the absence of the 
transnational Court. It operates with/under international 
private law, not EU law. A professional association, the 
European Patent Lawyers Association as well as a high-
level official in the Brussels administration (who later 
became responsible for the legal department at EPO) 
were also involved. Judges, lawyers and members of 
EPO assembled at the so-called Venice Forum (VF) 
where we collected network data in 2009 – in addition 
to data on perceptions, opinions and normative 
choices. We measured several social networks of 
these judges: discussion, reading decisions made by 
colleagues across borders, citation of decisions made 
by colleagues across borders in one’s own decisions; 
and finally recognition of European colleagues 
considered to be ex ante leaders personifying the future 
European Uniform position on patents. The latter were 
expected to become members of the Court of Appeals 
of this jurisdiction, generating substantive interpretation 
of patent law and jurisprudence on which European 
judges would eventually align. Note that this collegial 
oligarchy of judges, who called themselves a “conclave,” 
did not include representatives of civil society 
associations challenging patents as the right way to 
encourage innovation – raising the issue of “democratic 
deficit” of such institutionalization processes.
This collegial oligarchy of institutional entrepreneurs 
who were also cross-level actors succeeded in 
pushing to the creation in 2013 of the European 
Unified Patent Court (UPC), a new type of judicial 
institution still waiting for ratifications by key European 
national parliaments. This VF social movement also 
informally selected and lifted the collegial oligarchy of 
super-central judges in inter-individual networks who 
acquired the high multilevel status that they needed to 
work convincingly (from the perspective of their peers) 
on harmonizing the common legal interpretation of 
the European patent: clarifying anticipations, freezing 
expectations, obtaining alignments on cross-level 
linchpins. These supercentral players are identified in 
Figure 7 mapping the Uniform network among them. 
They were the most eminent among the judges in this 
“patent conclave,” thus expected to sit on the future 
Court of Appeal of the UPC once it would become 
operational. As cross-level linchpins, they had 
enough multilevel status and the right kind of rhetoric 
as judicial entrepreneurs to wield influence in this 
transnational institution building process.
Here we see similar complementarities, but also 
conflicts, between levels: indeed in the European judicial 
architecture, the national judge is always the first level 
European judge, and national judges assembled in 
Venice were active in their national courts at various 
levels (from local first level to field-level regulated by 
Supreme courts). Thus, in this case, the national judges 
at the VF were also multistatus, vertical linchpins who 
punch above their weight in collective agency, especially 
in regulatory, institutionalization processes (Lazega, 
2001). These actors with heterogeneous, high and 
inconsistent forms of status (i.e. in situations of conflicts 
of interests) were also thinking multilevel, with relation-
ships between levels tense and contradictory, each 
country having historically developed its own patent law, 
within its own national innovation system, national legal 
culture and democratic division of powers.
In particular, this example emphasizes the soci-
alizing dimension of coopetitive learning, i.e. the 
fact that this process generates both epistemic 
and normative alignments. Drawing on collective 
learning among themselves, they were getting to 
know their foreign colleagues and the ways in which 
they “construe the claims” of litigating parties in their 
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respective jurisdictions. Based on this knowledge, 
these judges tried to hammer out a “harmonized” 
legal interpretation of the European Patent – although 
they ended up producing a common, procedural 
“weak culture” (in Breiger’s sense), to start creating 
alignments and a process of convergence and 
“harmonization” at the European level (Lazega, 
2012a; Lazega et al., 2017).
Note that high multilevel status of super-central 
judges in collective learning is not transformed into 
political capital purely mechanically. Table 1 shows 
an ERG model of this Uniform network, in which 
Figure 7: The tip of a multilevel institutional iceberg: a collegial oligarchy of institutional 
entrepreneurs as vertical linchpins involved in coopetitive learning and selection of its ex ante 
leaders. Network map of a EU “patent conclave”, the collegial oligarchy crafting the “European 
Compromise”. Mapping the ‘Uniform’ network: “Who expects whom to represent the future 
Uniform position, if any?”. Clarifying anticipations, freezing expectations, obtaining alignments on 
cross-level linchpins/collegial oligarchy: Multistatus German, UK and Dutch judges: Judges with * 
are super-central judges.
(See “Learning from lobbying”, Utrecht Law Review, 2013) 
Table 1. Winners and losers from heterogeneous types of capitalism in the Europe 
des Juges institutionalization process.
Level 1: Judges
Level 2: Capitalism block
(See ‘Collegial Oligarchies in Transnational Institution Building’, with Eric Quintane and Sandrine Casenaz, Social Networks , 2016)
 
71
CONNECTIONS
these “activist” judges who get involved in politics, 
who share the same rules, and who produce a 
new private/public transnational institution, do not 
necessarily look up to the same normative ex ante 
leaders. Belonging to countries characterized by 
the same kind of capitalism and broadly defined 
legal culture have no direct effect, on their own, on 
selecting these normative ex ante leaders. However, 
the interaction effects of both variables help 
understand the construction of this collegial oligarchy 
and the need for observing and testing cross-level 
dependencies over time. These judges as vertical 
linchpin institutional entrepreneurs discreetly involved 
in politics were trying to promote a new private/
public transnational institution (the European UPC) 
and to put the issue on the political agenda of the 
European Commission. Understanding their agency 
requires thinking in terms of dynamics of multilevel 
networks. Whether this political process produces a 
new Europe des Juges (Dehousse, 1999) remains to 
be seen.
Multispin: contextualizing social  
processes and dynamics of  
multilevel networks
As suggested by Table 1, the macro level and the meso 
level contexts jointly matter for coopetitive learning and 
for the selection of rules to make judicial decisions. 
The socio-economic and political context needed 
to catalyze such multilevel network dynamics is no 
less complex than these dynamics themselves. For 
example, it provides and sorts personnel (Tilly, 2003), 
helps select leaders and facilitate their circulation, 
excludes dissenters, mixes members of different 
social niches, creates moments of synchronization 
between the dynamics of several levels influencing 
each other. In Figure 8, we represent this context 
as a multilevel spinning top, or “multispin,” a rough 
metaphor of stability from movement (Lazega et al., 
2011; Lazega, 2016b, 2017) and of synchronization 
in these multilevel network dynamics. In this system 
judges are becoming increasingly central over time as 
they move across hierarchical levels. They rotate and 
move across jobs, which creates intense relational 
turnover. This combined OMRT can create upward 
mobility for vertical linchpins (but also downward 
mobility for others). In turn, mobility helps create the 
specific multipositionaly-with-status-inconsistency that 
is associated with institutionalization of new norms, i.e. 
participation in institutional change.
In this multispin as a (rather rigid) metaphor of 
the context facilitating the institutionalization of 
new norms at the transnational level, the network 
dynamics of selection of ex ante leaders in this 
collegial oligarchy indicate processes at superposed 
levels that co-evolve, influence each other and lead to, 
or undermine, synchronization. This gives us insights 
into the production of cross-level linchpins but also of 
the dynamics that push and pull them across levels. 
Notice the stairs in the shaft of the multilevel spinning 
top, representing upward mobility of vertical linchpins 
associated with institutionalization of new norms, but 
also the fact that there are losers in these dynamics 
of multilevel networks of institutionalization. For the 
latter, multilevel networks lead to nowhere. The 
dynamics of bottom up collegiality promoting cross-
level vertical linchpins can also demote them. Relative 
structural stability regardless of membership turnover 
was identified in judges’ advice networks and 
coopetitive learning using stochastic blockmodeling 
and Siena models (Lazega et al., 2011; Lazega 
et al., 2006), exposing a cyclical centralization−
decentralization−recentralization of advice networks 
as stabilization provided by this multispin. This was 
confirmed at the inter-organizational level by Brailly 
et al. (2016) in the study of the global trade fair in 
which clusters of sales representatives participating 
in the market were unstable over time while clusters 
of the companies and organizations in which these 
persons were affiliated were more stable. Indeed high 
turnover at the interindividual level and the stability 
of the structure at the interorganizational level could 
Figure 8: Context as multispin providing 
stability from movement in multilevel 
relational infrastructures. Multispin 
(multilevel spinning top) as direct 
context of multilevel networks, driving 
the organized mobility and relational 
turnover of their members (individuals, 
organizations, governments).
(See ‘Organized Mobility and Relational Turnover as
Context for Social Mechanisms , in J.Glückler, E.Lazega &
I.Hammer (Eds), Knowledge and Networks, 2017)  
Level of Inter-governmental
network
Staircase for  
vertical linchpins  
Level of inter-organizational 
network
Level of Inter-individual 
network
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be hypothesized to co-generate each other, often 
by dumping synchronization costs on individuals 
(Lazega, 2016a).
The dynamics of cross-level linchpins becoming 
increasingly central over time and moving across 
hierarchical levels to institutionalize new norms 
across borders, these dynamics show how such 
multistatus and cross-level actors steer the multilevel 
structures that help communities navigate obstacles 
in key social processes. Note that multispin as 
a metaphor also reminds us that there are many 
examples of such promotion and navigation 
processes that exclude political opponents by just 
making the cost of synchronization between levels 
too high for them. OMRT as determinants of social 
processes can help filter, close, solidarize, lift and 
ratchet up a collegial oligarchy at the top. Again, the 
more open at the bottom, the more closed at the 
top. These promotions can often squander the social 
capital of the collective. The norms and institutions 
that they promote may not be considered legitimate 
if their assumed followers do not participate in their 
formulation, selection and promotion.
Dynamic multilevel networks  
to explore politics in the  
organizational society
In conclusion, the reason social processes can be 
navigated by relational infrastructures is that these 
relational infrastructures impose a form of social 
discipline that shapes the course on these social 
processes as capital of the collective. Acknowledging 
superposed levels of collective agency and analyzing 
them separately and jointly focuses the attention 
on multilevel relational infrastructures that help 
revisit vertical and horizontal differentiations in 
society. For example, individuals active at two levels 
simultaneously, i.e. vertical linchpins with multilevel and 
inconsistent dimensions of status who punch above 
their weight in the political process. Or multilevel social 
niches, i.e. combinations of roles played by members 
of a block of individuals at one level and the roles of a 
block of organizations at the other level, given affiliation 
ties. As seen with coopetition, processes at each level 
influence each other across levels, coevolve and can 
synchronize – although this synchronization cannot be 
taken for granted or assumed to be equally costly for all 
actors across levels. Dynamics of multilevel networks 
is a mindbogglingly complex set of phenomena with 
many components moving at the same time: different 
kinds of actors, behaviors, interactions, relationships, 
attributes such as positions and affiliations, relational 
infrastructures, social processes, encompassing 
global contexts creating mobility and inequalities.
The three case studies of coopetition in science 
(multilevel networks of researchers), in business 
(multilevel networks of sales representatives), and 
in government (multilevel networks of transnational 
judges as institutional entrepreneurs) help us explore 
aspects of this temporal multilevel social order and 
the implications of this approach for social network 
analysts today. Analyses of relational infrastructures 
of coopetitive learning in science show that individuals 
and organizations are equally, but differently, 
important for creating and sharing new knowledge 
with key multilevel players. Observation of multilevel 
relational infrastructures of coopetitive learning in 
business shows that synchronized temporalities of 
individuals and organizations are key to the building 
of a new global cultural order using markets. Tracking 
multilevel relational infrastructures in lobbying shows 
that the construction of institutions also requires 
what we called “stability from movement,” this time 
in coopetitive learning, i.e. intense OMRT as context 
for these multilevel relational infrastructures and, with 
this mobility and turnover, diverse levels of access to 
law – indeed in many cases too much access to law. 
Witnessing success in the deployment of such social 
processes, we can be led to believe that organizations 
are more important than individuals. This is only 
true when our measurements are static; over time, 
individuals and their personalized relationships matter 
just as much, with increasing intensity of conflicts and 
power plays being managed with new cohorts relying 
on complementarity and synchronization of levels.
We are just beginning to explore these dynamics 
of multilevel relational infrastructures in collective 
agency, a field of research for the future. As sug-
gested by our last illustration, a better knowledge 
of navigation of social processes with the dynamics 
of multilevel networks in the organizational society 
helps to better understand politics and contemporary 
transitions, especially institutional change in the face 
of depleted common pool ecological resources 
(Bodin, 2017) and increasing social inequalities.
For example, multilevel relational infrastructures 
and multilevel network models of navigation of 
social processes can measure the extent to which 
democracies have become elitist and unequal, 
and focus on how powerful elites will behave in the 
coming transitions. In the context of an organizational 
and class society, relational data is not data like any 
other. It can increasingly help Big Relational Tech 
(BRT), i.e. relational data hegemons, identify, coopt 
or undermine the vertical linchpins and collegial 
oligarchies that dominate collective learning and 
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institutionalization processes in society. Social net-
works touch deep and we are becoming increasingly 
transparent to such organizations. The concentration 
of power that big relational data represents because 
of its increasing value as indicator of social processes 
and their multilevel navigation has yet to be understood 
and to sink in. Then, if power must check power, who 
will check these hegemons (Al-Amoudi and Lazega, 
2019)? At least three implications follow from such 
questions for our academic research.
First, the social construction of multilevel extensions 
of opportunity structures through dual alters is not just 
decisive for individual destinies; it is also important 
in the collective, political construction of the micro−
meso−macro links. There are no mechanical transitions 
from the individual, to the dyad, to the triad, etc. until 
one reaches the collective with its morphological, 
horizontal and vertical differentiations and structures, 
such as multidimensional status and division of work. 
There is no such a mechanical transition without levels 
in a stratigraphy, and without multilevel strategies, 
including these selective extensions, in fact without 
millions of such extensions. These extensions and 
their consequences are not studied yet in spite of 
their obvious political importance, for example, in 
regulatory processes. It will be up to neo-structural 
sociology to show how they are created, and a special 
attention could be paid, for example, to how dual alters 
participate in anyone’s engagement in citizenship and 
political institutionalization of any new normal.
Second, evolution of multilevel relational 
infrastructures and social change drive each other 
in the organizational society, which is a class society 
where organizations are “tools with a life of their own” 
evolving in “dynamic constitutive fields” (Selznick, 
1949). In the navigation of social processes, multi-
level relational infrastructures can create collegial 
oligarchies and democratic deficits. From “big fish in 
the big pond” to “cross-level linchpins” to “institutional 
entrepreneurs,” this often leads to rebuilding ins-
titutions and societies through very discreet, techno-
cratic, social and institutional engineering (such as 
finding/recommending/assigning the “right” alters 
and dual alters for any task). It is therefore part 
of our responsibility as social scientists to keep 
identifying these multilevel relational infrastructures 
and the elites’ ways of managing/navigating the 
social processes that our societies are made of: 
solidarities, controls, regulations and learning. For 
any controversial issue, in all domains, small private 
collegial oligarchies pop up, selected privately 
through sifting and lifting by multispins in every field. 
One of the latest was by a BRT company to decide 
what is fake news, what is angry mood manipulation, 
and how to deal with them. The more we know about 
dynamics of multilevel networks as public scientists, 
the more we will be able to contribute to managing 
the roller coasters of these social processes in which 
we are embarked. Therefore we need new richer data 
structures, more powerful network statistics to tests 
hypotheses on dynamic, multilevel networks.
Third, one implication of neo-structural research 
is that we need to keep collecting and criticizing our 
own social network datasets combining structure, 
culture and agency (Archer, 1982; Reynaud, 1989; 
Breiger, 1990, 2010; Favereau and Lazega, 2002; 
Grossetti, 2011; Lazega, 2012b), and to develop 
network literacy along with thorough organizational, 
ethnographical and qualitative analyses. We should 
not give up designing our own research on the 
ground, collecting our own small and multilevel 
datasets, listening to how people themselves make 
sense of their actions, relationships, contexts, 
controversies, etc. If we do not measure and model 
these processes ourselves, only BRT will, and we will 
no longer be able to understand these processes in 
the original language. We can keep learning with our 
small datasets, especially when big relational data 
is not accessible to scientists in decent conditions. 
This is the only way to keep the knowledge of social 
processes public and democratic.
A hidden competition is under way between 
public social sciences and private social sciences 
to track these realities. Following two generations 
of “governance,” collegial oligarchies of top-down 
collegiality emerge in many social niches making 
political decisions without saying so, privately de-
signing changes in public institutions, not just in 
governments and government-related committees. 
Public social scientists and social network analysts 
should not let this disappear from the sight of the 
wider public. Much remains to be done to be useful in 
that respect.
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